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South Africa: Internal Security Apparatus

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A Research Paper

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June 1984*

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [] Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with a
contribution from [] Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa
Division, ALA, []

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**South Africa:
Internal Security Apparatus**

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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 15 May 1984
was used in this report.*

South Africa's white minority has invested heavily in a pervasive and growing internal security apparatus that enforces and defends apartheid, the core of the country's unique sociopolitical order. We estimate that one in eight South African whites—that is, some 600,000 men and women—participates at least part-time in some aspect of internal security or defense. Combined police, prison, and defense expenditures account for almost \$4 billion, or 20 percent of the budget. Moreover, we estimate that the two key pillars of apartheid—the black homelands and controls on the movements of blacks—this year will cost the government an additional \$2.9 billion, or 14 percent of the total budget.

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The South African Police (SAP), a nationwide paramilitary organization with some 43,000 members, forms the backbone of the internal security apparatus. This national force includes secret police and riot control components as well as traditional uniformed and detective units. It is backed up by a vast array of security legislation that permits detention without trial and wide powers of search and seizure. In addition, the government limits press coverage of the security forces and their activities. The government has stated publicly that it plans to expand the size of the SAP by 60 percent as funds become available, which would make it larger than the present size of any black army in southern Africa.

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The SAP has recruited nonwhites since its inception, and they make up about half of the force. Of the nonwhites in the SAP today, 80 percent are black, 14 percent are Colored, and 6 percent are Indian. The position of nonwhites in the SAP has improved in recent years, but the leadership remains overwhelmingly white.

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The South African military plays a key role in assisting the SAP in maintaining internal order. Military units share border security responsibilities with the police, provide vital support to large-scale police sweep operations and manhunts in rural areas, and have backed up the SAP during major internal disturbances. Moreover, the Army's Commando Force, comprised of local home guard units, is designed to provide a blanket defense throughout the country and to prevent attacks on important government and industrial facilities. Civilian-staffed Civil Defense units under the direction of the Minister of Defense operate throughout South Africa and are buttressed by numerous white gun clubs and neighborhood defense groups.

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Other government or quasi-government security units include the Railway and Harbor Police, the Prison Service, and large numbers of private police hired by white local governments to perform a variety of services, including assisting in the destruction of black shantytowns and the removal of blacks from areas designated for whites only. The nominally independent black homelands also have security forces that work closely with South African units. [REDACTED]

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The private security industry in South Africa has burgeoned since the Soweto riots in 1976. Today it employs some 250,000 people and caters to the security demands of white citizens, the commercial sector, and the government. [REDACTED]

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Under the stewardship of Police Commissioner Coetzee since last year, the South African security apparatus is slowly changing its image. Riot and security police are resorting less often to the brutal tactics that in the past guaranteed them international media exposure and Western condemnation. In addition, members of the security forces have begun to be held accountable and criminally liable for abuses committed in the line of duty. [REDACTED]

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The size and pervasive influence of South Africa's internal security apparatus reflects the determination of white South Africans, especially Afrikaners, to maintain political control. Pretoria's recent efforts to diminish the use of harsh, high-profile security measures and to curb police abuses are designed in part to defuse Western criticism, but also to increase the effectiveness of the internal security system. While the government's security methods have changed, its ends have not. As long as the white minority in South Africa considers racial politics as a life-and-death issue, Pretoria will continue to take actions in the name of security that will strain relations with Washington and complicate US dealings with black African states who accuse the United States of condoning South Africa's apartheid policies. [REDACTED]

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South Africa: Internal Security Apparatus

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An Overview of the Internal Security Apparatus

The South African Government, like most of the country's white citizens, is preoccupied with security matters.¹ Surrounded by hostile black states and outnumbered almost 6 to 1 by nonwhites at home, the white minority regime has erected a massive security structure that guards against insurrection at home and Communist-backed insurgencies based in neighboring states. We believe its armed forces are the strongest in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it is widely accepted that they could defeat the armies of any likely combination of black states. Moreover, the military is sustained by the largest armaments industry in Africa, according to press reports.

The internal security apparatus in South Africa is made up of governmental—police and military—and private components:

- The South African Police (SAP) is a national force with primary responsibility for internal security. Its 43,000 members, nearly half white, serve in traditional uniformed and detective sections, as well as secret police and riot control units. The SAP is supported by an additional 40,000 reservists and an unknown number of municipal and provincial traffic policemen.
- The South African Defense Force (SADF) plays a key role in assisting the SAP in maintaining internal order. Military units share border security duties with the police, provide vital support to large-scale police sweep operations and manhunts in rural areas, and have backed up the SAP during major internal disturbances. SADF active and reserve personnel total almost 400,000; some 98 percent are white.

¹ Indicative of the security consciousness of South Africans is the prevalence of gun ownership among the country's more than 4.7 million whites, many of whom belong to gun clubs and neighborhood crime prevention groups. According to a press report in May 1983, nearly 1.8 million South Africans, more than 95 percent of them whites, have firearm licenses.

- The South African Railway and Harbor Police, organizationally separate from the SAP, has about 6,500 members who protect the country's vital transportation network of rail lines and ports.
- A Prison Service force of over 14,000, nearly half white, guards South Africa's penal facilities.
- A large private security industry in South Africa is a \$500 million a year industry and employs some 250,000 people, including about 50,000 security guards.

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Cooperation Among the Security Forces

South Africa's security forces work together closely, especially in antiterrorist operations and exercises. To enhance cooperation, the government in June 1980 established a Counter-Insurgency Committee made up of intelligence service representatives to coordinate information on terrorists and to recommend security strategy. The Committee meets every two weeks and forwards its recommendations to Prime Minister Botha via the State Security Council, a senior decisionmaking body with members drawn from the Cabinet and security services.

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local authorities and nongovernmental security personnel were disrupting area businesses by overreacting to a rash of false bomb threats following the car bombing in Pretoria. After a series of inter-agency meetings, government security services responded by instructing authorities on the scene to call Security Police for instructions before clearing buildings and cordoning off work areas.

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
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Police, Army, and Air Force personnel have engaged in joint manhunts employing patrols, roadblocks, aerial reconnaissance, and massive sweep operations, according to press and US defense attache reporting. In August 1983, personnel from the Army, Air Force,

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Uniformed and Special Task Force sections of the SAP, Railway Police, Civil Defense Corps, local municipal and traffic police, fire departments, and ambulance services took part in a large-scale defense exercise in downtown Johannesburg. Coordination among the various units during the exercise, which included a staged terrorist takeover of a passenger bus, was excellent, according to press statements by the police. []

Changing Methods

The SAP is gradually changing its security tactics and is now using less provocative and lower profile measures. A new emphasis is on curbing police abuses that have been responsible in the past for triggering violent confrontations. However, police officials have sought increasing restrictions on security-related reporting by the media, according to press reports. []

Prime Minister Botha, and particularly Commissioner of Police Coetzee who came into office in 1983, are primarily responsible for the tactical shift now taking place, in our judgment. Botha, under pressure from the West, probably is trying to improve the image of the SAP to complement his overall program of gradual racial reform. Coetzee has long been a proponent of nonprovocative security measures that he believes are more effective than traditional intimidation, according to the US Embassy. While the police still use excessive force on some occasions, according to eye-witness accounts in the press and opposition party claims in Parliament, Coetzee—with Botha's support—has made headway in implementing his policies. []

Police Tactics. In the past, the SAP frequently used force far out of proportion to the threat at hand. Policemen often ignored SAP internal regulations that call for a series of nonviolent steps to be taken initially to disperse agitators. Riot units, armed with truncheons and supported by attack dogs, often made immediate charges against black crowds. Most notably during the Sharpeville incident in 1960 and the Soweto riots in 1976, police fired on unarmed blacks. Individual policemen were seldom penalized for using excessive force. []

Since Coetzee took over as Police Commissioner last year, however, there have been a number of new trends in police and internal security policies and tactics:

- Policemen are not using excessive force in riot situations as often as they did in the past, and, instead of intervening immediately, have allowed many local flareups to burn out naturally, according to US Embassy and defense attache reporting.
- High-profile antisubversion measures such as bannings, detentions without trial, and listings are used much less often than in previous years.² The Minister of Law and Order stated in Parliament in February 1984 that 21 persons were in detention, and 12 were banned. In comparison, South Africa detained more than 600 persons and banned 170 in 1981, according to press reports. In July 1983 the government reduced the number of listed persons from more than 450 to 120. []

South African police also had gained a reputation for abusing political prisoners during interrogations and have been blamed by South African and international human rights groups for the deaths of numerous detainees. From 1977 to 1979, there was a significant increase in the number of South Africans, virtually all blacks, dying in detention under mysterious circumstances, according to Embassy reporting. []

Detainee deaths ceased abruptly in 1979 when Coetzee, then newly appointed head of the SAP Security Branch, vowed to prevent those under his command from causing any more embarrassing deaths of detainees, according to the US Consulate in Johannesburg. No further deaths occurred until white trade unionist Neil Aggett committed suicide in detention in February 1982, unleashing a wave of protest from antiapartheid and international human rights groups.

² Banning is a form of internal banishment that varies in application, but a banned person usually may not meet with more than one person at a time or be quoted in the media and must live within a prescribed area and report regularly to the police. A listed person cannot be quoted in the media. []

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Angered by the incident, Coetzee demoted, transferred, or reassigned those officers who participated in the brutal interrogation sessions that may have prompted Aggett to take his own life, according to the US Embassy.

Press Restrictions. The government controls security-related stories in the South African press by requiring authors to submit them for approval to the South African Publications Appeals Board, local security officials, or both, before publication. Several laws,

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including the Publications Control Act and the Internal Security Act, prohibit the South African media from publishing sensitive or "false" information on security forces, strategic installations, and South Africa's energy needs and policies. A local journalist told the US Embassy last year that the government bans press coverage of many terrorist incidents and trials in rural areas. [REDACTED]

The SAP frequently has restricted journalists from entering areas where police plan to take actions against nonwhites. Most of these incidents have involved black protests or riots, but the police also have prevented newsmen from covering forced resettlements of nonwhite communities and the destruction of black shantytowns. Police officials publicly stated during the widespread riots in 1976 and 1977 that the presence of journalists incited blacks to seek confrontations with the police for propaganda purposes. [REDACTED]

Police Commissioner Coetzee has sought even further restrictions on the media, including banning press coverage of certain court trials. Some sensitive court cases, especially those involving espionage, already are closed to the public. Coetzee has repeatedly stated in the press that he believes many political trials involving members of antigovernment groups also should be held behind closed doors to deny these groups the opportunity to score propaganda victories. [REDACTED]

The government's rigid enforcement of press restrictions has drawn domestic and international criticism. In recent years, the government has prosecuted or threatened action against 11 editors of major South African newspapers, according to a press report. At times, it has gone to extremes to enforce bannings and listings.³ [REDACTED]

Future Trends

South Africa has paid a large price in both government spending and sacrificed economic growth to build and maintain its internal security system. In the current fiscal year (1 April–31 March), combined police, prison, and defense expenditures account for almost \$4 billion, or 20 percent of the budget. Moreover, the two key pillars of apartheid—the black

homelands and controls on the movements of blacks—will cost the government an additional \$2.9 billion, or 14 percent of the total budget, according to press estimates. In addition to normal budget authorizations, extrabudgetary funds are allocated for security, according to press reports. The government also forgoes some economic growth by diverting skilled white labor from the business sector to nonproductive, defense-related jobs and lengthy national service stints. We estimate that as many as one in every eight white South Africans is involved at least part-time in some aspect of internal security and defense. [REDACTED]

Despite the high costs, we expect the government to continue to bolster South Africa's internal security and defense forces. The government backed up its announced plans to expand greatly the police force by increasing the most recent police budget by 40 percent over the previous fiscal year. The military's public criticism of the country's Civil Defense capabilities suggests that the government may devote more funds and effort to improve the program. [REDACTED]

Although South Africa will continue to invest heavily in both internal security and defense, we doubt it can prevent the ANC from mounting terrorist attacks. During a trial of captured ANC guerrillas in May 1984, a security policeman testified that the group has conducted 225 terrorist operations against South Africa in the last eight years. Only moments before the ANC exploded the devastating car bomb in Pretoria on 20 May 1983, Minister of Defense Malan told Parliament that ANC bombings since 1978 had inflicted \$635 million worth of damage. [REDACTED]

Among the targets successfully attacked by the ANC have been extremely well-guarded showcase energy facilities that we believe were selected by the group for political and propaganda purposes. In 1978, two years before the ANC bombed South Africa's synthetic fuel facilities, the SADF rated the Industrial Commando unit responsible for protecting those facilities as the most efficient Commando Unit in the country. The ANC scored another major victory in December 1982 when it bombed the Koeberg nuclear facility, probably the most heavily guarded installation in South Africa, and forced the facility to delay opening for 15 months. [REDACTED]

³ For example, last year a judge found a Johannesburg newspaper guilty for printing a statement by banned African National Congress Acting President Tambo: the newspaper quoted Tambo as saying he could not be quoted because he was banned. [REDACTED]

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In the past year, South Africa has used military and economic pressure to force many of its neighbors to expel or severely restrict the ANC. In our view, the ANC will try to compensate for this loss in regional support by increasing its political action within South Africa. We believe that Pretoria shares this assessment and will step up its harassment of political and labor groups suspected of having ties to the ANC.

While the government's security methods have changed, its ends have not. In our view, as long as the white minority in South Africa considers racial politics as a life-and-death issue, Pretoria will continue to take actions in the name of security that will strain relations with Washington and complicate US dealings with black African states who accuse the United States of condoning South Africa's apartheid policies.

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Foremost among these groups is the United Democratic Front, a multiracial coalition of over 500 diverse groups that was formed last year to protest the government's constitutional reforms. Many UDF leaders and member groups have ties to the ANC, according to Embassy reporting, and, in our view, the UDF has provided a vehicle for pro-ANC elements in the country to organize antigovernment protests. The UDF has not yet been banned, but [redacted] the government is gathering evidence to incriminate the group. [redacted]

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ANC Acting President Tambo told the Zambian press in June 1983 that political action, especially among the black trade unions, is the ANC's first priority. Nonwhites make up 71 percent of South Africa's work force, and some 500,000 blacks already are members of trade unions. While the Embassy believes the ANC has been unable to gain much influence in the the black trade union movement, the police in the past have detained union leaders suspected of having ties to the group. [redacted]

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South Africa's extensive security apparatus reflects the determination of white South Africans, especially the Afrikaners, to maintain control of the government. Pretoria has moved to diminish its traditional use of harsh, high-profile security measures in part to diffuse Western criticism, but also because police officials believe their new methods are more effective.

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South African Police

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South African Police

The South African Police (SAP) force is the backbone of the country's internal security forces. It is a multiracial national paramilitary organization that serves as the primary instrument of the state in maintaining internal security, enforcing the law, protecting life and property, and combating crime. In the last three decades, police in South Africa have gained a wealth of experience in controlling black discontent, have demonstrated an ability to harass and root out protest groups, and have forced black guerrilla organizations to base most of their activities outside of the country. According to government data, the SAP budget has more than doubled in the last three years to some \$650 million (3 percent of the total budget), reflecting the government's commitment to expand and strengthen the force. []

According to government publications, the SAP operates under the authority of the Minister of Law and Order and is administered by an appointed commissioner who holds the rank of general and directs police operations from a central headquarters in Pretoria. For administrative purposes, the SAP divides the country into 19 territorial divisions, each commanded by a divisional commissioner who normally holds the rank of brigadier. The divisions comprise 84 police districts nationwide, which in turn are broken down into a total of 931 police stations and 39 border posts. Functionally, the SAP is divided into three main branches: Uniformed, Detective, and Security Branch. []

Uniformed Branch

The Uniformed Branch has some 35,000 members, who are mainly concerned with preventing crime, controlling riots, investigating minor infractions, conducting routine patrols, and administering the force, according to US defense attache reporting. All police recruits upon completion of initial training first enter the Uniformed Branch. []

Riot Police. Among the most important components of the SAP Uniformed Branch are the riot squads that are based in most major urban areas. Police riot units deployed in the past decade have been predominantly white, although government figures indicate that approximately half of all nonwhite policemen have undergone specialized training in riot control.

The South African Police: Past and Present

The SAP evolved from the amalgamation of early British and Afrikaner police units. By the late 19th century, the Afrikaner republics in the Transvaal and Orange Free State maintained paramilitary mounted police units. In the Cape Colony, the British set up a more modern police force called the Cape Constabulary patterned after the metropolitan police in London. After defeating the Afrikaners in the Anglo-Boer War at the turn of the century, the British reorganized the police in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, forming the Transvaal Police and the Orange River Colony Police in 1908. []

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Following the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910, police forces from the four provinces were consolidated under the Police Act of 1912 into two new units: the South African Mounted Riflemen, responsible for patrolling rural and border areas, and the SAP, tasked to maintain public order in urban areas and the adjacent countryside. During World War I, the SAP assumed the duties of the Mounted Riflemen, who were mobilized for military service. The SAP absorbed the Riflemen after the war and in 1936 received statutory jurisdiction for law enforcement throughout the country. []

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The SAP's historical role in maintaining the security of South Africa has included service beyond the country's borders. An SAP contingent served in North Africa in World War II and in the Rhodesian conflict from 1967 to 1975. In 1979, Parliament passed an amendment to the Police Act that formally allows the government to use the SAP anywhere in the world in conjunction with South African military units. The SAP today has contacts with security units in neighboring black states that avoid dealing with Pretoria on the diplomatic level. For example, Pretoria recently has used police channels to press Lesotho and Botswana to sign formal security agreements with South Africa, according to US Embassy reporting. []

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Most antiriot personnel spend the majority of their working hours conducting patrols, according to press reports. [REDACTED]

Riot units use a wide variety of crowd control equipment. Based on press reports, standard riot gear includes camouflaged battle dress, gas mask, visored helmet, plexiglass shield, and a hard rubber truncheon. Riot police also have used assault rifles, automatic weapons, and shotguns on occasion, according

to press reports. In 1979 the SAP owned 1,335 specially designed riot trucks and had 80 Saracen armored personnel carriers on loan from the military, according to government data. The trucks include light armored vehicles that are used extensively during severe riots to protect policemen and intimidate the crowds. Some trucks also are equipped with loudspeakers, according to press reports. [REDACTED]

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Riot police in Soweto in 1980.

Camera Press ©

The government seems determined to experiment with technologically advanced crowd control equipment. [redacted]

Canine Corps. Government reports show that, in 1983, the SAP had nearly 700 trained dogs for patrol, tracking, and bomb sniffing. Dog and handler undergo a four-month course together at the SAP Dog School at Kwaggaspoort, near Pretoria. Some dog and master teams even receive parachute training for use in border patrol and counterinsurgency operations in areas inaccessible to regular police vehicles. The Corps uncovered 52 bombs in 1983, according to police statistics. [redacted]

Riot police use several different types of tear gas, according to [redacted] press reports. Canisters can be thrown by hand or launched from a rifle or pistol, and senior police officials told the press in February 1981 that all SAP patrol vehicles were being fitted with aerosol cans of tear gas. Riot police use a vehicle-mounted rotary dispenser known as a sneeze machine that emits tear gas mixed with talcum powder, and another unit known as the foghorn can be hand-carried or wheeled and sprays a thick white mist containing a skin irritant. [redacted]

Radio Control. Known popularly as the Flying Squad, this section operates in urban areas. Flying Squad members are usually the first to arrive on the scene following an emergency and call in other SAP units according to the situation. The Squad uses hundreds of high-speed cars and vans equipped with long-range two-way radios, all controlled from a communications center at Police Headquarters in Pretoria, according to police publications. [redacted]

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Security and Town Planning

Security is paramount in town planning. Most black townships are purposely separated from white residential and urban areas and accessible only by a few roads. For example, roads between the work center of Johannesburg and the black residential township of Soweto are not connected to the rest of the highway system in the area. There are no entrances to or exits from the Soweto thruway once it leaves Johannesburg and begins to cross an area of open fields toward Soweto. By using roadblocks, police can quickly seal off the township and also have a clear view of motorists who try to evade them. []

Security considerations undoubtedly played a major part in determining the internal design of black townships, as well. Larger black townships built by the government are famous for their distinctive rows of identical houses. []

[] regulations governing the design of black townships have long been intended to provide riot police with maximum maneuverability. []

[] general guidelines followed by civil engineers and architects planning black townships near Durban in the late 1950s called for:

- Township roads wide enough for a South African armored personnel carrier to make a u-turn.
- Houses built no closer than a specified distance so as not to impede police weapons fire and to make it more difficult for a fugitive to evade authorities.
- A distance between the boundaries of the township and main highways in the area that exceeded the range of a high-powered rifle, presumably to protect travelers from snipers and even errant police shots in the event of a serious disturbance.
- Convenient vantage points for police vehicles to gather at and monitor wide areas of the township.

Township designs gradually are changing, but security concerns appear to remain a high priority. For example, South Africa is planning to construct 52,000 houses for 300,000 blacks at Ekangala in Transvaal Province by the year 2000. The 11,000 houses already constructed at Ekangala do not fit the standard mold of the past as they vary in size, design, and even color. However, the township is being built about 100 kilometers away from Johannesburg and will have only one or two access roads, according to a press report. []

Government officials, who we believe were moved to take action by the large-scale disturbances involving nonwhite students in the last decade, have implemented measures to protect the police and decrease the chances of school violence spreading:

- The US Embassy notes that the dynamics of school protests today are quite different than at the time of the Soweto riots in 1976. The schoolyards are now fenced, making it more difficult for outside agitators to go from school to school turning isolated local grievances into more widespread, coordinated protests.
- The boycott of nonwhite schools throughout much of South Africa in 1980 was accompanied in some areas, especially near Cape Town, by violent acts perpetrated by students against motorists and police vehicles on the major highways. The SAP have responded by making a major effort to cut down bushes and trees along national and secondary roads in the vicinity of the nonwhite communities to reduce the possibility of ambushes, sniping, or rockthrowing, according to the US Embassy. []

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Police dog in action. [redacted]

Sygma ©

Police Air Wing. The Air Wing, established in 1965, flies reconnaissance missions and is used at times to transport special police tracking teams to border and rural areas. It works closely with the Flying Squad. Some members of the Air Wing are civilian pilots under contract to the SAP, according to police publications. The South African Air Force (SAAF) often lends aircraft and pilots and provides air support to the SAP, especially for drug and counterinsurgency operations. [redacted]

Firearms Squad. According to information from a government publication, the Squad was established in 1949 to prevent the persistent outbreaks of clan warfare among Zulus. The Squad has three separate units, all based in Natal Province, which try to stop the flow of illegal arms and confiscate weapons produced by the Zulus. The Squad has seized more than 6,000 guns over the past few decades and many more knives, spears, and machetes, but has been unable to eradicate the clan conflicts. The US Consulate in Durban reports that factional fighting in northern Natal—which has resulted in hundreds of deaths in recent years—is a major security headache for the SAP, which faces almost insurmountable logistics problems because of the lack of roads in the area. [redacted]

Quartermaster. In addition to its supply and maintenance responsibilities, this section also supervises the Mechanical School in Benoni, where approximately 1,000 policemen are trained annually in the driving and maintenance of more than 12,500 SAP vehicles, according to police reports. [redacted]

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Criminal Investigation Branch

The Criminal Investigation Branch, popularly known as the Detective Branch, investigates serious crime in South Africa. The Branch has some 6,000 members, all of whom served previously in the Uniformed Branch, according to police reports. Detective candidates must pass a three-month training course and a one-year probationary period. [redacted]

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The Detective Branch is divided into numerous sections, most of which deal with a specific type of crime. Some of the more important sections include the following:

- The Commercial Branch investigates such white-collar crimes as company fraud, insolvencies, and illegal stock exchange, banking, and insurance activities.
- The Diamond and Gold Branch is responsible for cracking down on the lucrative black market in gems and valuable metals. 25X1
- A modern Forensic Science Laboratory and a criminal records archives called the Criminal Bureau are used extensively by detectives. The SAP plans to computerize its criminal records and set up an automated national identity system in the next four years at a cost that could top \$320 million, [redacted] 25X1
- The Murder and Robbery Unit.
- The Narcotics Bureau. 25X1
- The Stock Theft Unit, which works mostly on horseback in rural areas. [redacted] 25X1

Crime in South Africa

Crime in South Africa is primarily a nonwhite phenomenon. According to police statistics, 97.2 percent of the homicide victims in 1982-83 were nonwhites, and 97.6 percent of the murderers were nonwhites. Several nonwhite communities in the country are among the highest crime areas in the world. According to police officials, over 1 million serious crimes are reported in South Africa each year, a quarter of which are assault cases. In addition, local criminologists estimate that up to 70 percent of crimes in nonwhite communities go unreported. [redacted]

The Cape Town area has the highest crime rate in the country. Each year, approximately 25 percent of South Africa's violent crimes are committed there, where Colored youth gangs known as tsotsis are prevalent. (Tsotsi is Zulu for gangster.) [redacted]

[redacted] the per capita homicide rate in Cape Town is 3.5 times greater than in New York City. A South African criminologist reported in 1980 that the homicide rate in Rondebosch, a white, middle-class suburb of Cape Town, was six murders per 100,000 residents, while the rate in Guguletu, a nearby black township, was 192 murders per 100,000 residents. [redacted]

Soweto probably has the highest murder rate of any urban area in the world, according to various academic studies. (see table 1). Local police officials

blame the high rate on the abuse of alcohol by blacks. Police claim that blood tests on murder victims in Soweto last year revealed that 88 percent of them had been drinking, and 80 percent of the homicides occurred near the approximately 2,000 local taverns, known as shebeens. The link between drinking and homicide in Soweto is not unique; for example, two-thirds of the homicides in the United States each year are alcohol related, according to US Department of Justice figures. The high rate of murders in Soweto, however, in our view, reflects the many frustrations of the traditionally dynamic, politicized, and heterogeneous community, and the anarchy that prevails there, especially at night. [redacted]

Soweto has a large but inadequate security force. The Greater Soweto area is divided into two police districts and has seven police stations. The SAP regularly patrols the township in radio-equipped Landrovers and often sets up roadblocks, especially on weekends when most serious crimes occur. The inability of the SAP to control crime in Soweto, however, has spurred the growth of local vigilante groups. The largest group, known as Makgotla, has 2,800 members in 25 ethnically organized branches, according to press reports. Makgotla carries out regular foot patrols in the area and sometimes punishes offenders by conducting public floggings. [redacted]

Security Branch

The South African Security Police (SASP) is a multi-racial force of some 2,000 that works primarily against subversives within the country, although it also has personnel and informants throughout southern Africa and in Europe, according to press reports. The SASP is a highly effective organization whose methods, according to press reports and academic studies, range from using sophisticated surveillance equipment to issuing blunt warnings to antigovernment groups. SASP offices are located in most major urban centers in South Africa and report directly to SASP headquarters in Pretoria rather than through divisional SAP commanders. [redacted]

The SASP focuses much of its attention on the ANC. [redacted]

[redacted] the SASP has a special section to debrief captured ANC guerrillas and then recruit them as police agents. ANC Acting President Tambo admitted [redacted] in October 1983 that SASP penetration of his group was a serious problem and added that one recent group of 10 guerrilla recruits was found to have nine police spies in it. [redacted]

Table 1
Comparison on Violent Crime in
New York City and Soweto, 1983

	New York City	Soweto
Population	7,100,000	1,500,000 (est.)
Homicides	1,628	1,408
Rapes	3,662	1,206
Police strength	22,855	1,300

Black trade unions have been another important target of the SASP in recent years, according to US Embassy reporting. Since 1981 the majority of detainees have been black trade unionists, many of whom have been accused of having ties to the ANC. Last fall, the Minister of Law and Order publicly denied charges that the government was trying to crush the black trade union movement and justified the growing percentage of labor detainees on grounds that they were special targets of Communist subversion. [REDACTED]

Security Police in Namibia. The SAP has been active in Namibia since 1939. Police counterinsurgency (COIN) units under the command of the SASP still serve in Namibia, but work primarily to neutralize insurgents of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), according to police publications. [REDACTED]

The most notorious police COIN unit, known as *Koevoet*,⁴ operates in northern Namibia and southern Angola. The sole task of the unit is to hunt down SWAPO insurgents. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It pursues this objective in close cooperation with other South African security forces. Koevoet is a more aggressive force than other COIN units and is credited with the deaths of over 80 percent of SWAPO insurgents killed in Namibia, according to press reports. It is a quick-reaction force that acts on the basis of its own intelligence. [REDACTED]

⁴ *Koevoet* is Afrikaans for *crowbar*. [REDACTED]



Counterinsurgency police deploying from helicopter. [REDACTED]

Koevoet is made up of about 1,600 Namibians and 400 white South Africans, according to recent press reports. White officers lead Koevoet teams of 25 to 50 black Namibians. The white leadership is made up of conventionally trained policemen who volunteer for Koevoet duty and undergo a strict selection process and training regimen. The majority of blacks in the unit are Ovambos who are recruited within Namibia and are known for their excellent tracking and survival skills. [REDACTED]

Koevoet's reputation for ruthlessness has been documented in recent years by numerous court cases detailing alleged abuses, including the torturing of local residents to gain information. One white member of Koevoet testified in a Namibian court last November that he was paid a flat rate of \$315 a month, but that he received bonuses ranging from \$180 to \$400 for each SWAPO guerrilla he killed. Police officials have denied publicly that Koevoet members get paid for "successful" missions, but have admitted that a bounty system is used throughout Namibia to gain information on SWAPO guerrillas and weapon caches. [REDACTED]



Members of SAP Koevoet unit. [redacted]

Special Task Force

The Special Task Force is an elite police team designed to combat urban terrorists and quell riots. The SAP set up the Task Force following an incident in downtown Johannesburg in 1975 in which local police had difficulty apprehending a sniper who had wounded numerous passersby. [redacted]

The Task Force is based at the SAP Training College in Pretoria and is on 24-hour call. The US Embassy reports that the Task Force is capable of mobilizing in less than 12 minutes and flying to anyplace in South Africa in less than two and a half hours. Because of high stress connected with the job, the average Task Force member serves only two years before returning to normal police duty, according to an SAP recruiting pamphlet. In addition to being on constant call, Task Force members undergo daily training and drills to keep in peak readiness. [redacted]

The Task Force is used most often to quell riots. It saw extensive action during the widespread disturbances following the Soweto riots in 1976. According to the US defense attache, police officials were impressed by the performance and utility of the Task Force during the riots. They subsequently set up smaller versions of the Force in the main population centers, or attached 12- to 18-man "reaction teams" to local riot units. These teams are trained to respond instantly to crises and contain them until the Task Force can arrive. [redacted]

Task Force Training

Prospective members of the Task Force undergo a grueling selection process. Police volunteers over 21 must complete a rigorous six-month course that includes instruction in mountaineering, deployment from a helicopter, parachuting, scuba diving, sharp-shooting, bomb disposal, explosives, and weapons familiarization. Less than 50 percent of screened applicants successfully pass the course. Those who fail are still considered above-average policemen and are normally transferred to local riot units where their training can be put to best use. [redacted]

An additional duty of the Task Force is to provide protection for VIPs. According to Embassy reporting, important government officials traveling on commercial flights are accompanied by two undercover Task Force members armed with 9-mm handguns, which fire special plastic rounds that can kill an attacker but not puncture the aircraft fuselage. [redacted]


Task Force members are specially trained to deal with situations in which terrorists have seized hostages, but some of their past operations, in our view, reflected the aggressive nature of the Force rather than its professionalism. In 1980, Task Force members rushed a bank in Pretoria that had been taken over by three terrorists, and, in the process, the terrorists and two female hostages were killed and 22 other hostages and one policeman wounded. [redacted]

Police Strength

The SAP is small compared to police units in Western countries. Government figures last year showed a total SAP force of 43,000. This translates into 1.7 policemen for every 1,000 South Africans,⁵ compared to ratios of 2.2 in Britain, and 3.2 in New York City.

⁵ The South African population figure that was used in the calculation of this rate does not include the four "independent" homelands, which have their own police units. South Africa is responsible for the security of the six other homelands that have not yet attained "independence." [redacted]

Secret



Special Task Force during exercise. [redacted]

These statistics are misleading, however, because the SAP is backed by a large reservist system and other governmental police units, and has greater legislated freedom of action than Western units. Moreover, the SAP has devoted few resources to preventing and investigating crime in nonwhite communities, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

The Minister of Law and Order stated last year that the SAP will be further expanded by about 60 percent to about 70,000 as funds become available. We believe the planned expansion of the SAP reflects government concern over the fast-growing black population and prospects for increased unrest. Relative to South Africa's present population, the proposed size of the SAP would result in about 2.7 policemen for every 1,000 people, and the SAP would be larger than any present black army in the region. [redacted]

Recruitment

Recruitment for the SAP is done through local police stations, according to the US defense attache. After initial training, a new SAP member generally begins working at the local station that recruited him. This procedure inspires each station to recruit vigorously, and guarantees that the new officer will have some area familiarization on his first assignment. [redacted]

The government contends publicly that recruits of all races receive the same six-month training course, but at separate facilities. White recruits are trained at the

Table 2
Expected Growth in South African Population

	Spring, 1984		Projected for 2000	
	Population (million)	Percent of Population	Population (million)	Percent of Population
Blacks	22.70	73.0	34.50	76.9
Whites	4.75	15.3	5.80	12.9
Coloreds	2.77	8.9	3.50	7.8
Indians	0.87	2.8	1.10	2.4
Total	31.09	100.0	44.90	100.0

Sources: US Census Bureau and South African Government figures.

South African Police College at Pretoria West; Coloreds at Bishop Lavis near Cape Town; Indians at Wentworth near Durban; and blacks at Hammanskraal, north of Pretoria. The majority of the staff at each location are of the same race as the recruits. [redacted]

Whites

Slightly more than half of the SAP's members are white. Figures for the authorized strength of the SAP in 1983 indicate a government desire to maintain a slight white majority. The ratio of whites to nonwhites in the SAP has remained steady at about 1 to 1 in the last few decades, probably by government design. Although the SAP had severe problems recruiting whites in the last decade,⁶ government statistics show that it turned away thousands of nonwhites seeking to join the force, most likely to preserve the racial balance. [redacted]

⁶ Between 1970 and 1977, some 11,200 white SAP members left the force, and in 1980 alone over 2,000 white policemen resigned to seek higher paying jobs elsewhere, according to government reports. The force had an overall personnel increase of about 300 in 1980, but experienced a net loss of 462 whites. In the early 1980s, the military annually allocated up to 500 conscripts to the SAP to ease police manpower problems, according to police reports. [redacted]

The SAP: A Paramilitary Organization

Basic police training accurately reflects the SAP's claim in recruiting brochures that it is a semimilitary organization. The course includes light infantry training, parade and ceremonial drill, and self-defense. Recruits learn to use the R1 rifle, the standard weapon of the SADF infantry, and undergo limited instruction in crowd control and counterinsurgency techniques, South African law, basic administration, crime investigation, and race and public relations. Specialized training is offered later in the officer's career. At the Maleoskop Counter-Insurgency Training Center northeast of Pretoria, for example, thousands of policemen each year are instructed in counterinsurgency, riot control, and ways of combating urban terrorism.

Three pay increases in the last four years have made a police career more attractive to young South Africans, especially whites, who recently have been joining the SAP in record numbers. The SAP increased by 9 percent in 1982 alone, with a net gain of 3,000 members, according to government data. The most recent wage increase in January 1984 raised salaries an average of 33 percent, but particularly favored low-ranking policemen. A white policeman today receives a starting annual salary of \$7,300, representing more than a 300-percent increase over the \$1,800 he would have been paid in 1978. South Africa also provides policemen with housing, medical services, subsidized food, a pension, and other benefits, but not overtime pay, although many policemen work long hours because of the manpower shortage. In 1983, SAP personnel logged more than 2.5 million hours in overtime, according to an SAP official.

Nonwhites

The SAP has had nonwhite members since its inception. Of the nonwhites in the SAP today, 80 percent are black, 14 percent are Colored, and 6 percent are Indian, according to press reports. The position of nonwhites in the SAP has improved in recent years, but the leadership remains overwhelmingly white. In 1981 the Commissioner of Police publicly reported



Policemen provide cover for injured colleague.

that the SAP officer corps was made up of 791 whites, 85 blacks, 33 Coloreds, and 21 Indians. Last fall for the first time, the SAP promoted a Colored and an Indian to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and two blacks to the rank of full colonel.


The salaries of black policemen are the lowest of the four major racial groups. The government reported last fall that the salaries of Colored, Indian, and white policemen are almost the same up to the rank of major, and are equal from the rank of lieutenant colonel upward. Black policemen, however, receive pay that ranges from 45 to 65 percent of white salaries for the same rank, according to US defense attache reporting.

For most of the force's history, blacks did not carry arms or receive weapons training. In 1972 the SAP provided an initial group of 294 blacks with counterinsurgency and weapons training, according to police reports. This group, and others trained later, were assigned to armed border units under the command of white officers. In the mid-1970s, the SAP issued

⁷ In 1980, white policemen received starting salaries of \$2,700; Indians and Coloreds were paid \$2,370; blacks earned \$1,635. Since 1981 the government has withheld information on the breakdown of police salaries by racial group.

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Profile of White Policemen



White policemen are a homogeneous group; about 90 percent of them, and almost all senior officers, are Afrikaners. The Chief Chaplain of the SAP said in 1981 that 64 percent of white policemen are members of the Dutch Reformed Church, while most of the remainder belong to other Afrikaner churches. The average white SAP member has had less schooling than his military counterpart or white jobseekers in most other sectors. The government, however, recently has claimed that the SAP is attracting better educated recruits because of the salary increases.

Politically, the whites in the SAP form a conservative group, even by South African standards. In our view, this reflects the Afrikaner working-class background of most white policemen, and the SAP's principal role during the last 35 years in upholding apartheid.

most white SAP members are supporters of the rightwing Conservative Party.

pistols to the small number of black lieutenants scattered throughout the country. The white SAP leadership apparently gained added confidence as a result of the efforts of loyal black policemen during the widespread internal unrest following the Soweto riots in 1976. At present, all SAP members receive arms training and are issued an R1 rifle and a handgun upon graduation from police college.

Nonwhites also have benefited in recent years from a shift in police command regulations. Before February 1981, white policemen exercised authority over non-white SAP members irrespective of rank, according to press reports. The order of precedence is now determined solely by rank, although in practice few stations have blacks supervising whites. Some stations, however, are staffed entirely by nonwhites: 40 were run exclusively by blacks, 10 by Coloreds, one by Indians, and five by Indians and blacks, according to 1983 government figures.

Women

The shortage of white males in the South African work force has prompted the SAP to draw increasingly on females of all races. The SAP has trained over 2,000 female recruits in the last 12 years, and 1,425 policewomen, including 27 officers, were members of the force in 1982. When more living quarters for policewomen are constructed, the SAP plans to train up to 432 females annually, according to a senior officer in the Women's Division.

The SAP first accepted white women in 1972, Colored women in 1981, and Indian women in 1982. Last year, the SAP claims it received an overwhelmingly positive response during its first recruiting drive among black women, as over 300 applied from the black township of Soweto alone. The SAP trained an initial contingent of 21 black women in 1983 and expects to train another 40 this year. According to an SAP officer, policewomen in the SAP receive the same pay and benefits regardless of race.

Reserve Police Force

The South African Reserve Police Force (SARPF) is made up of more than 22,000 volunteers, about 87 percent white, who assist the SAP in almost all functions and undergo much of the same training as regular policemen. Many SAP stations are staffed almost entirely by Reserve Police Force members on weekends and holidays, according to a recent article in the police magazine. Reserve Police Force members wear the same uniforms as full-time SAP officers and can rise to the rank of full colonel.

Nonwhite Policemen

Nonwhite policemen in South Africa operate under extreme social pressures, generated largely by their positions as enforcers of apartheid. Many nonwhites who join the SAP are immediately regarded as outcasts and traitors by factions in their own communities.



Police recruits in training.

Gamma-Liaison ©

Nonetheless, the SAP has not faced a shortage of nonwhite recruits because many nonwhites apparently believe that the economic benefits of the job outweigh its social costs. Moreover, the SAP in recent years has improved security at black-staffed police stations that the Police Commissioner claims are priority targets of the ANC, which is extremely hostile toward black policemen and has conducted numerous operations against them in the last eight years.

- *Group B.* Known as the home guard, these unarmed reservists patrol their own residential areas and perform two hours' duty per day without compensation during emergencies.
- *Group C.* These reservists are employed by local authorities and private firms to perform patrol and guard duties.
- *Group D.* These volunteers assist police stations in rural areas, serving especially in auxiliary mobile units. They are specially trained to combat rural disturbances, as there are no regular SAP riot units in most rural areas of the country.

Reserve Police Force members, especially those receiving no pay, are mainly white males. The Commissioner of Police in the Western Cape told the US Embassy that a large number of white businessmen and farmers belong to the Reserve Police Force, but that the SAP's attempt to enroll young nonwhites has been a failure. Women, however, were allowed to join in 1982 and now number some 580. The Commander of the Reserve told the press that the decision to accept women was based in part on the SAP's recruiting problems in the early 1980s.

The Reserve Police have traditionally been divided into four groups, according to police reports:

- *Group A.* Members are required to serve at least four hours per month at local stations, work full-time during emergencies, and receive pay at a special rate. They undergo extensive police training and are issued firearms.

Other Reserve Police Force functional groups include more than 200 divers who assist in recovering drowning victims and stolen goods; nearly 600 ham radio operators who volunteer their services and equipment to assist the police, especially in rural areas; and the Junior Reservists Corps. The latter is made up of some 1,100 young white volunteers who receive extensive police instruction, including arms training, but may serve only during school holidays and under the supervision of an SAP officer or a senior member of the Reserve Police Force, according to a police publication.

Secret

The Reserve Police Force was established in 1961 when it became evident the SAP was undermanned. During the Sharpeville riots that year, scores of citizens volunteered to serve as Special Constables and assist the beleaguered SAP, according to a police journal. The next year, Parliament approved the establishment of a permanent Reserve Police Force.

[REDACTED]

SAPR members are trained to fill in for regular police in a variety of roles. In December 1982, 19 SAPR members underwent an intensive 16-day counterinsurgency course that included training in weaponry, map and compass reading, bushcraft, and antiambush tactics, according to a police publication. The challenging course has a dropout rate of 40 percent, according to the commanding instructor.

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[REDACTED]

The role of reservists significantly expanded after the riots in 1976. Members of the Reserve Police in the Western Cape appealed to the Commissioner that year to start a reservist antiriot unit. By 1980 the SAP had trained one reservist platoon armed with batons and shields and another, known as R1 Platoon, with the same equipment and weapons as regular SAP riot units. The R1 Platoon was placed on standby every fourth week to fill in for the regular riot unit. The platoon's satisfactory performance has encouraged the SAP to establish antiriot reservist units in several key areas of the country.

[REDACTED]

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Small groups of reservists have recently been undergoing standard police counterinsurgency training. Some of these units have even been assigned to border operational areas for active duty stints of a month and longer, according to a police report.

[REDACTED]

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South African Police Reserve

Established in 1973, the South African Police Reserve (SAPR) is made up of ex-policemen^{*} paid to assist the SAP. In 1983, about 85 percent of the almost 18,000 SAPR members were whites, according to government figures. Active members, about one-fourth of the force, serve less than 180 days per year for a period of eight years. In 1983, 2,444 active SAPR members served at SAP stations, and 314 others performed border duty. All members, active or not, serve during emergencies when ordered by the Minister of Law and Order.

[REDACTED]

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^{*} This is the main feature that distinguishes the South African Police Reserve Force from the similarly named South African Reserve Police Force.

[REDACTED]

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Other Internal
Security Forces

Secret

Railway Police Special Task Force members during exercise involving staged takeover of bus by terrorists. [redacted]



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Other Police and Security Forces

South African Railway and Harbor Police

The South African Railway and Harbor Police (SARHP) is responsible for protecting the country's airports, eight significant harbors, and 5,500 kilometers of state-owned and private railway lines. The SARHP is not subordinate to the SAP, and the commander of the SARHP reports directly to the Minister of Law and Order, according to the US defense attache. [redacted]

In 1980 there were more than 6,500 men and women in the multiracial SARHP, including 221 officers. According to the US defense attache, members of the SARHP receive infantry training and specialized instruction in transportation security; an SARHP official stated in December 1982 that 50 volunteers from the force were serving a three-month tour of border duty. The unit is assigned light armored vehicles for airport security, and members of the force are armed with handguns and automatic rifles. [redacted]

The 75 members of the South African Railway Police Special Task Force counterterrorist unit specialize in thwarting hijackers, rescuing hostages, and protecting VIPs. Task Force recruits are drawn from the ranks of the Railway Police and normally range in age from

18 to 24. The US defense attache reports that more than 60 percent of the applicants are rejected after stringent psychological and physical testing. Members of the Task Force are specially trained in close combat, according to the US defense attache. Training takes place at the Railway Police College at Esselenpark (near Kempton Park), and at a newer training center at Salberg. [redacted]

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Municipal and Provincial Traffic Police

The majority of municipal and provincial policemen in South Africa enforce traffic laws and municipal regulations, allowing the national SAP to focus its attention on more serious matters. Municipal and provincial police are not subordinate to the SAP, except during joint operations and training exercises, according to a government publication. [redacted]

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Some municipal governments also maintain their own special security units. In 1978 the Johannesburg Traffic Department set up a riot squad equipped with the same gear and weapons as SAP units, according to press reports. Last year, the Johannesburg City

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Administration Board police removing black "squatters" from town in Transvaal Province. [REDACTED]



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Council approved the formation of a new Traffic and Security Department whose 1,500 members were to guard city-owned facilities, ensure public safety, and coordinate security activities with South African intelligence, police, and military services. [REDACTED]

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Following 13 ANC terrorist bombings in Durban in 1981, the city council of Durban in 1982 began organizing a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to guard important municipal installations. The council said it planned to have 200 RDF members by 1983. RDF recruits undergo an intensive two-month training course, run in part by the SAP, that covers instruction in weapons, unarmed combat, and legal practices, according to a press report. Using vehicle, dog, and regular foot patrols tied into sophisticated communications and intruder detection systems, the RDF continually monitors all municipal installations that provide essential services. [REDACTED]

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Administration Board "Police"

White local government departments that administer nonwhite townships employ large numbers of men, generally referred to as "administration board police," to collect rents, evict tenants, and in some instances help relocate the populations of whole townships. Since 1960, "administration board police" have

helped the government resettle some 3.5 million non-whites, most of them forcefully moved to one of the 10 black homelands. The administration board police also have the authority to arrest those who violate the so-called pass laws that govern the movement and residency of nonwhites. In 1982, they apprehended 112,646 pass law offenders, compared to 93,376 arrests made by the SAP that year, according to government figures. [REDACTED]

Administration board policemen frequently work closely with SAP units and take orders from SAP officers in the field during joint operations, according to press reports. Administration board police recruits are often brought in from outside areas by local government departments and trained by SAP officers. Last year, the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) police numbered 1,300, mostly blacks known locally as blackjacks. Some 80 percent of the force is concentrated in Soweto, and 40 members are trained at the local SAP Headquarters each month. WRAB police and SAP personnel often conduct raids together looking for illegal liquor, weapons, and residents. [REDACTED]

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South Africa: Prison Population

South Africa's prisoner-to-population ratio is higher than any in the Western world, according to a study by a South African crime institute in 1981. Last year, South African jails held a daily average of 105,500 prisoners, although capacity is 74,400, according to the Minister of Justice. In comparison, US federal and state institutions held 439,000 prisoners in 1983—four times greater than the prison population in South Africa. The total population of the United States—236 million—however, is nine times greater than South Africa's—about 26 million, excluding the four "independent" homelands, which have their own prisons. [redacted] in the 1970s, the daily prison population in South Africa increased by 12 percent a year while the overall population grew at an annual rate of only 7 percent.

Pass laws that restrict the movements of blacks are the main cause of the country's overcrowded prisons and clogged courts. Each year, between one-quarter and one-third of all blacks incarcerated in South Africa are accused of violating pass laws. Many of them remain in jail for weeks before their cases are heard and are then given small fines, usually under \$10, or short sentences. According to government figures, half of those in South African jails on any given day in 1981 were awaiting trial, 75 percent of those tried were not subsequently returned to jail, and 78 percent of those who were returned to jail received sentences of less than six months. In comparison, more than 80 percent of those in US jails who have been tried are serving sentences of more than five years.

South African Prison Service

South Africa's 24 main prisons are staffed by a 14,250-member prison police force that is administered by the Minister of Justice. The budget for South African prisons in the current fiscal year is \$280 million, representing an increase of more than a third over last year's budget. Approximately 60 percent of the South African prison police are whites, according to government data.

All recruits for the Prison Service undergo six months of specialized instruction, according to press reports. Whites are trained at the Kroonstad Prison complex in the Orange Free State, Coloreds at Pollsmoor Prison in the Cape Province, Indians at facilities in Durban, and blacks at the Zonderwater Training College in the Transvaal. The training includes courses in legal procedures, first aid, firearms, fire-fighting, self-defense, and physical fitness.

Homeland Security Forces

South Africa's apartheid scheme calls for the evolution of the homelands into independent states with autonomous security units. South Africa presently is responsible for the security of six homelands that have not yet become "independent," although some of these already have small indigenous police units. Pretoria, however, exercises control even over the security units in the four "independent" homelands by subsidizing the defense budgets of the homelands and by seconding officers from South African forces to the homeland units.

Each of the four independent homeland police forces numbers between 300 and 600 persons, according to US defense attache reporting.

The four independent homelands all have signed nonaggression pacts with Pretoria, and relations between South African and homeland security forces generally are excellent: *

- Homeland policemen regularly attend SAP courses at the Hammanskraal College near Pretoria. Moreover, the South African military has trained personnel from homeland armies in basic infantry and counterinsurgency courses lasting up to a year, and trained homeland soldiers have even served active border duty with South African units, according to press reports.

* Security forces in the four homelands have wide-ranging powers of search and arrest. Many of the homelands have adopted whole portions of South Africa's internal security legislation, including provisions on detention without trial. In 1981, 393 people were detained without trial by the four independent homelands, compared to 379 detained by Pretoria, according to a press report.

- The SAP has worked jointly with homeland police forces to prevent black guerrillas from infiltrating the country and to track them down following terrorist attacks, according to press reports. Moreover, the Minister of Law and Order revealed in Parliament in March for the first time that pacts exist between South Africa and the independent homelands of Transkei and Ciskei that permit police from each territory to cross mutual borders in the event of suspected or reported criminal activity.
- The US Embassy reports that the SAP, especially its Security Branch, has worked closely with Ciskei authorities against radical black unions and political opponents of President Sebe. [redacted]

Private Security Firms

The private security industry in South Africa has grown rapidly in the last decade, perhaps by as much as 500 percent, and now generates revenues of over \$500 million a year, according to the chairman of one of the largest local firms. The panic that gripped many white South Africans during the Soweto riots in 1976 sparked the growth of the industry. According to a press report, some 250,000 South Africans are employed by private security companies, including the hundreds of firms that deal in items and services such as fencing, alarms, video monitors, worker identification cards and systems, lie detectors, and bodyguards.

[redacted]

Last year there were some 350 companies in South Africa renting out the services of over 50,000 guards, according to press estimates. More than 90 percent of the guards are blacks, most of whom receive very low pay. The personnel director of the largest guard service in South Africa estimated last year that the average black guard receives only about \$135 a month, the minimum guard salary allowed by law, while whites receive about \$540 a month on average.

[redacted]

The abuse of black labor by security firms is widespread, according to numerous open sources. Seven-day workweeks with 14-hour days are common, and press reports claim that some black guards are forced to work 72-hour shifts at their post with no breaks. Last June the Basic Conditions of Employment Act contained specific provisions for security guards that set a maximum workweek of 60 hours, but the Act is

generally being ignored by the security industry, according to press reports. [redacted]

The widespread labor abuses in the security industry have spawned at least four separate associations that seek to improve the quality of the country's private security services and eliminate pirate firms from the industry. The largest of these associations claims to have more than 500 security firms as members. The government also is considering draft legislation that requires all security firms to be licensed and controlled by a state agency, according to press reports. The legislation, which is expected to be introduced in Parliament this year, has been endorsed by the police and military, according to the press. [redacted]

The rise in terrorist attacks since the late 1970s also has spurred the growth of firms that provide physical security against bomb blasts. The police have stated publicly that the majority of injuries resulting from ANC bombings have been caused by flying glass. Some proprietors of buildings in urban areas, therefore, have installed bomb-resistant, shatterproof windows, or "armorized" their windows with a special film that allows glass panes to fold inward without disintegrating.¹⁰ One of the largest South African firms that sells safety windows claims to have installed them in more than 3,000 buildings and offices in the country since 1976. However, a local newspaper survey of corporate buildings, government facilities, and shopping centers in Johannesburg and Pretoria in June 1983 found that only 5 percent of the buildings had "armorized" windows, safety glass, or bomb curtains. [redacted]

Dogs are widely used and sold by private security firms. A spokesman for one firm told the press that many guards are unarmed and welcome the protection of a trained dog. A private firm near Durban that specializes in training dogs to sniff out bombs also advertizes canines fitted with radio receivers for remote control use. [redacted]

¹⁰ The car bomb that the ANC detonated in downtown Pretoria in May 1983 was a powerful device that killed 19 and injured more than 200, most of the casualties caused by flying shards of glass from the many windows in the area. One department store's large front window that had been treated with the special film enfolded a group of people standing nearby without injuring them, even though the window was only 25 meters from the car bomb, according to press reports [redacted]

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**Military's Internal
Security Role**

Table 3
Military (SADF) Manpower

Total	393,500
Active duty	93,500
Ready reserve	125,000
Commandos (local home defense force)	175,000

Internal Security Role of the Military

The South African Defense Force (SADF) plays an integral part in assisting the SAP to maintain internal security. SADF units generally have functioned as reserve forces during the major violent disturbances within South Africa since 1960. The government presumably has been reluctant to deploy Army personnel against black protesters in South Africa because of likely negative political repercussions. The SADF has been much more active, however, in combating anti-South African black insurgents infiltrating from neighboring countries, according to government reports. []

The US defense attache reports that the South African Army is organized into three major groups of forces, of which the counterinsurgency forces are most closely associated with internal security.¹¹ The counterinsurgency forces in South Africa consist of 10 territorial commands, each tasked to:

- Maintain a tactical intelligence capability throughout its assigned area.
- Protect area residents, transients, vital industrial and government facilities, transportation and communications infrastructure, and local property from insurgent attacks.
- Maintain a mobile reserve force, known as an area reaction capability.

¹¹ The other two major groupings are the conventional forces and the support structure for administration, logistics, and training. []

National Service

A complex National Service (conscription) system requires eligible citizens to devote varying periods to training or active service throughout their lifetimes. Even before they are old enough to register for conscription in the SADF, up to 200,000 white males participate in high school "cadet" programs, and many also attend Boy Scout-type summer camps, both designed to prepare them for military service. The following data outline the typical service pattern required of eligible white South African males:

Age 16	Registration.
Age 18-19	Initial service in a Citizen Force Unit of two years' full-time duty.
Age 20-32	Additional service during six two-year periods, with up to 120 days of active duty in each period.
Age 32-36	Active service in the Citizen Force Reserve for five years, including liability for active duty during national emergencies, or assignment to an area Commando Unit.
Age 37-54	Commando Force service that carries liability for active duty within South Africa for 12 days per year.
Age 55-64	National Reserve service, involving liability during national emergencies.

- Support and participate in the joint management control system in the area that consists of committees through which military, police, and various public services coordinate local security responsibilities. []

Commando Force

One of the key elements subordinate to the territorial commands is the Commando Force, composed largely of area residents who have completed their two-year

national service stints.¹² The Commando Force's mission, according to the US defense attache, is to form a "blanket defense" against insurgents in rural, urban, and industrial areas so that the other components of the counterinsurgency and conventional forces—the Permanent Force, composed of career volunteerists, and the Citizen Force, made up of two-year conscripts and active reservists—can be used elsewhere. The US defense attache reports that the Commando Force does not substantially enhance the overall combat readiness of the SADF, but does improve South Africa's internal security and defenses against guerrilla infiltration. [redacted]

Commando Force ranks are filled by volunteers as much as possible, but also include some men fulfilling active reserve requirements under the National Service system. An individual Commando Force unit requiring more men to meet its commitment also can legally draft eligible local residents into service, according to the US defense attache. [redacted]

Members of all Commando units undergo weapons training and a wide variety of other instruction depending on their age, previous service, and the type of Commando unit they serve in, according to South African Government pamphlets. Members of Commando units in city areas are instructed in urban terrorism, crowd control, and roadblock procedures; farmers are instructed in countering guerrillas in a rural environment; and miners and factory workers are taught how to defend fixed installations. [redacted]

National Key Points

The National Key Points Act of 1980 empowers the Minister of Defense to declare as a "national key point" any place or area in the country that he deems of strategic importance to South Africa. It requires the owners of key points protected by the military to adopt and maintain security measures. Owners of key points who do not comply with the provisions of the Act can be fined up to \$26,000 and imprisoned for up

¹² The Commando Force has its roots in the Boer Commandos, local militia units that protected early Afrikaner settlements and later fought the British. After the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, the South African military was transformed into a formal standing army, patterned after the British model. The citizen-soldier was reborn, however, when an Afrikaner-dominated government came to power in 1948 and reintroduced the Commando Force into the Army. [redacted]

to five years. Parliament passed the Act in 1980, two months after the ANC attacked two synthetic oil plants and a large oil refinery in the Transvaal, causing \$8 million in damages and lost oil.¹³ [redacted]

Press estimates place the current number of key points at up to 1,000, which we assume fluctuates as new facilities are established and conditions within the country change. For example, during the recent drought in South Africa, seven dams were built on the Vaal River to provide water to power stations in the eastern Transvaal. After the dams were declared national key points, local Commando units built semipermanent camps alongside the vulnerable pump-houses of the dams. [redacted]

National key points are protected by personnel from private security firms or by Industrial Commando units made up of military personnel, according to press sources. Some Industrial Commando units are very large. The unit that guards the huge Modderfontein explosives production complex in the Transvaal, for example, has a headquarters company and four other companies, all supported by a small full-time administrative and logistic unit. [redacted]

The security costs of guarding national key points are shared by the government and by private industries designated as key points. By law, the government can charge private industries designated as key points for any security services it provides to them. In 1981, however, the Director of the National Key Points Secretariat told the press that the government had agreed in principle to provide key point industries with tax concessions for outlays on approved security expenditures. Private firms designated as key points that train their own security personnel can get tax rebates equal to double the salary of the employees for

¹³ The government had designated national key points long before the legislation in 1980. The practice originated in South Africa during World War II when "keymen" in the National Volunteer Battalion, consisting of citizens unable to serve in the Union Defense Force, protected vital facilities in the country. Prime Minister Verwoerd later reestablished a National Key Points Committee in 1965 in anticipation of growing internal security threats. [redacted]

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the period of training, provided the course has been approved by the Department of Manpower and by the National Key Points Committee. The 1980 Act lists a required training syllabus that includes surveillance, hand-to-hand combat, explosives, radio communication, firefighting, first aid, and basic concepts in criminal and civil law. Guards that will carry firearms on duty also must undergo weapons training. [REDACTED]

South Africa faces a shortage of guards qualified for key point duty, especially at key points in rural areas, according to a press report last year. Low salaries and standards in the private security industry are the main causes of the key point manpower shortage. [REDACTED]

Civil Defense

The Civil Defense Act of 1977 transferred control of the Directorate of Civil Defense, established in 1971, from the Minister of Police to the Defense Minister, giving him authority to declare a state of emergency with the approval of Parliament.¹⁴ According to a study by the Minister of Defense in 1982, an "alarmingly high percentage" of local authorities have made very little progress in the area of civil defense. [REDACTED]

CD units are designed to maintain essential services and save life and property during and after disasters without depending on the regular local services, according to a government brochure. The Directorate has assisted local authorities in establishing Civil Defense units in over 600 urban and rural jurisdictions. Volunteers 14 years old or older who are not

¹⁴ The Defense Minister is empowered to proclaim a three-month state of disaster in an area "to combat civil disruption" resulting from a situation defined as an act of God, an influx of refugees, or the consequences of terrorist activity. [REDACTED]

involved with any security-related government agency, except the military, can join CD units. [REDACTED]

Presently, CD units are a reactive, unarmed force. During the riots in 1976 and 1977, however, they were used by municipal authorities in Johannesburg and Pretoria as armed police reserves, primarily assigned to guard public property. The Act of 1977 ended this practice, as it prohibits training civil defense volunteers in security tactics or using civil defense funds for precautionary measures against civil disorder. Nonetheless, press reports indicate that the government in recent years has questioned the ability of CD units to function effectively in the event of an intensified guerrilla campaign against South Africa and is considering providing CD volunteers with counterinsurgency training. [REDACTED]

The CD Directorate Headquarters in Pretoria is responsible for overall planning, coordination of local efforts, and implementation of projects national in scope, according to a government report. The Defense Minister, however, has the authority to assume control of civil defense operations from local authorities as conditions require. [REDACTED]

South Africa is divided administratively into regional CD areas, each directed by a controller (frequently a retired military or police officer) and a main committee based at a "control center." The regional areas are subdivided into cells. Pretoria, for example, is divided into 27 main cells, each responsible for an area that has some 10,000 residents. In 1980, more than 1,000 volunteers manned CD units in Pretoria, and CD officials expected that number to double by the end of the year in response to a major terrorist incident that occurred locally, according to a press report. [REDACTED]

CD members serve voluntarily in the event of less serious local emergencies, but must respond when the government declares a state of emergency or disaster. Members also are called upon 96 hours a year for work or training. CD volunteers are assigned to

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functional teams and trained in first aid, communications, firefighting, transport work, traffic control, maintenance of essential services, and administration. CD members wear armbands while working and carry special ID cards. [redacted]

Local journalists report that South African CD units have responded well during several crises in recent years, including major terrorist attacks in urban areas, and that they have received training in frequent exercises that are sometimes carried out jointly with the SAP and other security forces. For example, during a two-day period earlier this year, fire, ambulance, communications, and medical teams from the Sandton CD cell responded to 49 emergencies in the Johannesburg area without any assistance from local services, according to a press report. [redacted]

Border Security

Both the military and the police are responsible for guarding South Africa's border areas against anti-South African guerrillas based in neighboring states. Security personnel man a string of camps and posts and patrol along South Africa's northern borders, according to press and US defense attache reports. [redacted]

Security forces are stretched sparsely along South Africa's borders with Zimbabwe and Botswana. A small police base camp located near Mafiking, for example, is responsible for protecting some 120 large farms in the area, according to a press report last year. The commander at Mafiking also controls three other police camps that together are tasked with monitoring 650 kilometers of South Africa's north-western border, according to press reports. During a four-day excursion along South Africa's borders with Botswana and Zimbabwe in 1982, US Embassy officials reported they did not see a single army or police patrol and that local farmers usually saw security units only every three months when new personnel were rotated in and made the rounds to meet the residents. [redacted]

South Africa has made a determined effort to secure its long eastern border with Swaziland and Mozambique. [redacted]

[redacted] South Africa is divided into priority areas, and the Northern Natal area,

which contains strategic rail and power networks vulnerable to sabotage, is priority sector number one. Prior to the signing of the Pretoria-Maputo pact in March 1984, the Northern Natal Military and Operational Area (NNMOA) represented a scaled-down version of the Army's defenses in northern Namibia, according to the US defense attache, and was designed to stop guerrillas from infiltrating South Africa. NNMOA headquarters at Jozini controlled three active infantry companies and two reserve Commando units. Shortly before the pact was signed, SADF officials declared that Northern Natal is no longer an operational area, thereby signaling their belief that the agreement with Mozambique would reduce the guerrilla threat to the region. [redacted]

The SAP also has been active in preventing guerrillas from infiltrating South Africa's eastern borders, but has relied primarily on an informer network rather than blanketing the area with police patrols. Local South African security officials told the US Embassy last year that security police have cultivated excellent relations with local residents who report on strangers moving through farms in the area, only 14 percent of which are unoccupied, according to government figures.¹⁵ The officials stated that they also have had great success in persuading captured ANC guerrillas to return and work within the ANC as police informers. [redacted]

¹⁵ In comparison, a government study found that about half of the farms near South Africa's borders with Botswana and Zimbabwe are unoccupied. According to press reports, those residents who remain in the area blame the mass exodus of white farmers from the region in the last decade on discouraging economic conditions that include high fuel costs, scant rain, expensive irrigation, and the poor quality of the land. [redacted]

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